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Freedom and political form:  
On Philip Pettit’s republican theory of democracy. 
 
Abstract: 
This article critically engages with Philip Pettit’s republican political philosophy, and with his 
republican theory of democracy in particular. After a brief summary of Pettit’s conceptualization 
of freedom as non-domination, the paper focuses on the question as to which institutional 
arrangement Pettit considers commensurate with this normative ideal. The paper prepares the 
ground for a critical reconstruction of Pettit’s theory of democracy by highlighting the 
understanding of democracy in the republican tradition within which Pettit aims to develop his 
contemporary theory of democracy. The reconstruction leads to the argument that Pettit, in neo-
Roman republican tradition, has written ‘the people’ as a transformative actor out of the script of 
democratic theory. 
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Neo-Roman republicanism and freedom as non-domination 
 
In his republican political philosophy, Philip Pettit advances two central arguments: first, 
freedom ought to be understood as non-domination and be embraced as the ultimate political 
value; and second, ‘politics’ ought to refer to rational and reason-bound decision-making. In a 
well-ordered polity, political institutions must entrench and sustain freedom as non-domination 
as well as procedures for rational and reason-bound policy-making. Pettit’s republican theory of 
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democracy aims to specify the political institutional order that is commensurate with the 
normative ideal of freedom as non-domination.  
 
Pettit develops his republicanism on the basis of two distinctions. First, he distinguishes between 
two republican ‘traditions’: the tradition of Italian-Mediterranean-Atlantic republicanism and 
that of Franco-Prussian (Rousseauvian-Kantian) continental republicanism.  Second, he sets 
‘republicanism’ apart from liberalism. Pettit traces the ‘classic republican’ tradition back to 
Roman republican thought and practice, stressing the central importance of Polybius, Cicero, and 
Livy. And it is within this tradition that Pettit proposes to develop a republican theory of 
democracy. In constructing a narrative trajectory, he places Machiavelli within a ‘neo-Roman’ 
framework of thought, arguing that this thought, and that of his Roman predecessors, provided 
terms of political self-understanding for Northern European countries in their struggle against 
absolute monarchs. He argues that, while the English republic in the 1640s and 1650s was short-
lived, it nevertheless had a deep impact not least through the ideas and writings of John Milton, 
James Harrington, and Algernon Sidney. Their thoughts informed political debate in 18th century 
Britain and America and were incorporated into Montesquieu’s writings. Republican ideas 
provided the arguments in the debates on American independence in the 1760s and 1770s both in 
the colonies and in Britain (for example, in the writings of Richard Price and Joseph Priestley) as 
well as in the constitutional debates of the 1780s, and for politicians and thinkers such as 
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison.1  
 
This neo-Roman republicanism from Machiavelli to James Madison was Ciceronian in 
inspiration and anti-Athenian in orientation:  
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These republicans pictured Athens … in the critical terms suggested by Polybius: as a ship 
without a captain, buffeted by the storms of popular opinion. They traced the Athenian 
problem to excessive reliance on pure democracy and saw the Roman Republic, by 
contrast, as a constitution in which government was built on a democratic foundation but 
was better devised to guard against problems of factions and demagoguery and tyranny. 
The principal devices they celebrated in Rome were the dispersion of democratic power 
across different assemblies, adherence to a more or less strict rule of law, election to public 
office, limitation on the tenure of public office, rotation of offices among the citizenry.2  
 
For Pettit, a hallmark of this form of republicanism is its wholehearted and enthusiastic embrace 
of “the enjoyment of a publicly protected freedom in the domain of private life – a freedom, in 
the republican view, that enables you to stand equal with others, not depending on anyone’s 
grace or favour”.3 Pettit distils from this republican tradition a conceptualization of freedom as 
non-domination:  
 
If you are to enjoy freedom as non-domination in certain choices … then you must not be 
subject to the will of others in how you make those choices ... you must not be exposed to 
a power of interference on the part of any others, even if they happen to like you and do 
not exercise that power against you. The mere fact that I can interfere at little cost in your 
choices – the mere fact that I can track those choices and intervene when I like – means 
that you depend for your ability to choose as you wish on my will remaining a goodwill.4  
 
In Pettit’s conceptualization, mere vulnerability to arbitrary power diminishes liberty. He sets 
this conceptualization of freedom as non-domination apart from a ‘liberal’ understanding of 
freedom as non-interference. He traces the main variants of this conceptualization back to 
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Thomas Hobbes and Jeremy Bentham respectively. “A free-man is he”, Hobbes argued in 
Leviathan (21.2), “that in those things which by his strength and wit he is able to do is not 
hindered to do what he has a will to”.5  Pettit interprets this statement as the proposition 
that “a hindrance takes away from my freedom only if I prefer the option that is subject to 
hindrance”.6 For Bentham, liberty was “the absence of restraint”: to the extent that other 
persons do not hinder a person, he or she is ‘free’. This conceptualization of freedom 
suggests, according to Pettit, that “[e]ven though you avoid interference only because of my 
being good-willed and indulgent, then – even though you can choose as you wish only 
because I permit – still … that is enough to make you free”.7 In his treatment of ‘liberty’, 
finally, Isaiah Berlin argued that “the deliberate interference of other human beings” offends 
against freedom.8 It is in view of Berlin’s distinction between ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ liberty 
that Pettit maintains that the conception of freedom as non-domination is  
 
negative to the extent that it requires the absence of domination by others, not 
necessarily the presence of self-mastery, whatever that is thought to involve. The 
conception is positive to the extent that, at least in one respect, it needs something 
more than the absence of interference; it requires security against interference, in 
particular against interference on an arbitrary basis.9  
 
It is the arbitrary power of interference on the part of others that makes a person unfree: 
“Interference that is uncontrolled by the person on the receiving end” signifies a lack of 
freedom.10  
 
Yet, significantly, he also contrasts his conceptualization of freedom as non-domination with 
freedom as civic involvement and participation, understood not as a means to secure an 
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individual’s liberty but as a good in itself and a necessary aspect of the good life. This 
conceptualization he considers to be central to (what he calls) Franco-Prussian continental 
republicanism. According to Pettit, this republican tradition embraces “the romantic idea of 
a participatory, Rousseauvian engagement”11 by emphasizing communal self-
determination through self-legislation and the right of popular participation in political 
decision-making while “downplay[ing] private life in favour of public engagement”.12  Pettit 
claims that, in this Rousseauvian republicanism,  
 
freedom consists in nothing more or less than the right to participate in … communal 
self-determination: the right to live under a regime of law that you have a certain 
participatory or electoral role in creating … This new ideology replaced freedom as 
non-domination with freedom as participation. It replaced the ideal of a mixed 
constitution with that of a popular, absolutely sovereign assembly. And it replaced 
the ideal of a contestatory people with that of a participatory legislature against 
which individuals had no rights in their own name”.13  
 
He sees Hannah Arendt as a major inspiration behind contemporary populist-
communitarian republicanism and he interprets her as endorsing participatory democracy 
and thus as drawing a “rather romantic picture of the tirelessly engaged public figure”.14 
 
The neo-Roman writers, on the other hand, do not focus, Pettit suggests, on “achieving 
participation”. Writers such as James Harrington, John Milton, and Algernon Sidney were 
critical of ‘popular democracy’. They took “liberty to be defined by a status in which the 
evils associated with interference are avoided rather than by access to the instruments of 
democratic control, participatory or representative. Democratic control is certainly 
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important … but its importance comes not from any definitional connection with liberty, 
but from the fact that it is a means of furthering freedom”.15 Indeed, we should take note 
that these republicans did argue that ‘the people’ entrusted a ruler with authority: “… a 
king is a king simply on account of the people, not the people on account of the king”; the 
people is “both itself its own lawmaker and able either to tighten or relax the power of the 
king”.16 Yet, who are ‘the people’? It includes, according to Milton, “all citizens of any rank 
whatsoever”, but it excludes “the rabble”, which is “blind and dull”, lacking in “the skill of 
ruling”.17 It is above all the “middle sort” of whose number “are the men who are almost the 
most sensible and skilful in affairs. As for the rest, luxury and opulence on the one hand, 
poverty and need on the other, generally divert them from virtue and the study of 
statesmanship”.18 They are the “better” and “healthier” and “sound” part of the people 
(“pars potior, id est sanior”; “sanae et integrae … partis”).19 
 
For the English republicans, a popular government would have, in James Harrington’s 
expression, “a mixture of aristocracy”.20 He saw a natural, meritocratic aristocracy, 
characterized by “wisdom and honesty”, as being “the only spur and rein of the people”:21 
“[W]here there is not a nobility to bolt out the people, they are slothful, regardless of the 
world and the public interest of liberty”.22 In popular government, “debate” is “managed by 
a good aristocracy”, for “debate in the people maketh anarchy”.23 The people, having been 
shown truth by this aristocracy, have an obligation to accept them as their guides.24  
Fear and distrust of the ‘common’ people are perennial features in Pettit’s republican 
‘tradition’. Cicero feared the power of the ‘multitude’. Referring to Athenian democracy, 
Cicero, in Pro Flacco, spoke of “the immoderate liberty and licentiousness” of the masses: 
“When inexperienced men, ignorant and uninstructed in any description of business 
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whatever, took their seats in the theatre, then they undertook inexpedient wars; then they 
appointed seditious men to the government of the republic; then they banished from the 
city the citizens who had deserved best of the state”.25 When the will of the people rules, 
then there is licentiousness, not freedom. Cicero considered it to be in the best interest of 
the vulgus, the “dregs of the city populace” (“sordem urbis et faecem”), that ‘the best men’ 
govern.26 In the ‘mixed constitution’ of the well-ordered polity, “there is enough power 
[potestas] in the magistrates, enough authority [auctoritas] in the deliberations [consilio] of the 
leading men [that is, the Senate, RA] and enough freedom [libertas] in the people”.27 Yet, in 
such a well-ordered community, “the senate [remains] master of public deliberation, and all 
persons defend whatever it determines, and … the other orders want the republic to be governed 
by the deliberation of the leading order”.28  
In North America, the War of Independence in 1776 had resulted in the democratization of 
the state legislatures of the former colonies. The size of the legislatures increased and the 
franchise was extended: “In all states electioneering and the open competition for office 
had expanded democratically, along with demands for greater public access to 
governmental activities”.29 Debt- and tax-relief legislation that was enacted by popularly 
elected state legislatures “revealed to the Revolutionary leaders an unanticipated dark 
underside to democracy and equality”.30 It was the composition and the policies of the state 
legislatures as well as the political activism of ‘the common people’ that convinced the elite 
revolutionary leaders that a new political order had to be constituted. Most members of the 
Constitutional Convention that met in Philadelphia in 1787 were agitated by what they 
perceived to be “the extremes of democracy”, the “prevailing rage of excessive democracy”, 
“democratical tyranny”, and “democratic licentiousness”.31 Elbridge Gerry and Alexander 
Hamilton spoke of “an excess of democracy”; Hamilton referred to “the amazing violence 
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and turbulence of the democratic spirit”; and Roger Sherman demanded that “the people 
[should] have [as] little to do … about the government” as possible.32  
 
The new federal Constitution became the manifestation of the successful counter-
revolution. In the creation of a Supreme Court, the Senate, and the Electoral College, the 
Constitution showed itself to be “intrinsically an aristocratic document designed to check 
the democratic tendencies of the period”.33 The justification of the ‘principle of 
representation’ in the Federalist Papers supports this assessment. ‘Representation’ was 
intended to achieve “the total exclusion of the people, in their collective capacity, from any 
share in [government]”. A Senate, whose members were elected not popularly but by the 
state legislatures, would ‘protect’ the people at moments - so James Madison argued in the 
same paper - when, “stimulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit advantage, or 
misled by the artful misrepresentation of interested men”, they “may call for measures 
which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and condemn”.34  
 
Madison had also asserted that in any given society “the most enlightened and impartial 
people” would be outnumbered by “the unreflecting multitude”. In order to confront the 
“Danger of Demagogues”, election, he asserted, had to be “made by the Peop. in large 
Districts”: 
 
[A] majority when united by a common interest or passion can not be restrained from 
oppressing the minority, what remedy can be found in a republican Government, 
where the majority must ultimately decide, but that of giving such an extent to its 
sphere, that no common interest or passion will be likely to unite a majority of the 
whole number in an unjust pursuit. In a large Society, the people are broken into so 
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many interests and parties, that a common sentiment is less likely to be felt, and the 
requisite concert less likely to be formed, by a majority of the whole … Divide et 
impera, the reprobated axiom of tyranny, is under certain qualifications, the only 
policy, by which a republic can be administered on just principles.35  
 
Gouverneur Morris, who represented Pennsylvania, revealed the ‘class’ aspect that is 
typically hidden behind the rhetoric of (numerical) minorities being oppressed by 
(numerical) majorities: “The schemes of the Rich will be favoured by the extent of the 
Country … [Ordinary] people in such distant parts can not communicate & act in concert”, 
placing them at a disadvantage compared with “those who have more knowledge & 
intercourse” with each other.36 
 
In the republican tradition that Pettit privileges and within which he proposes to formulate 
his contemporary theory of democracy, ‘democracy’ was not a regime type that these 
republicans keenly wished to institute and defend as a manifestation of ‘freedom’ but 
which they eagerly desired to contain and tame since it was seen as a threat to ‘freedom’. 
‘Pure’ democracy was rule of ‘the plebs’, of the poor, uneducated, incapable, irresponsible, 
and uncouth masses; a rule better described as an ‘ochlocracy’, mob rule, that would 
inevitably lead to anarchy. Democracy, so republicans argued, deprives ‘the best men’ – 
virtuous, noble, wealthy, educated, and experienced men – of the power to rule the political 
community, and to rule it for ‘the common good’. The oligarchs in Republican Rome aimed, 
just like English republicans and the ‘Founding Fathers’, at the exclusion of the people, “in 
their collective capacity”, as it says in the Federalist Paper number 63, from political power.   
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This republican tradition thus aims to contain and curtail the power of the people to act. 
Algernon Sidney had suggested that “[a]s to popular government in the strictest sense (that 
is pure democracy, where the people in themselves, and by themselves, perform all that 
belongs to government), I know of no such thing; and if it be in the world, have nothing to 
say for it”.37 Pettit, too, argues that the populist ideal of participatory democracy is neither 
feasible in the modern world nor is “the prospect of each being subject to the will of all … 
attractive”.38 All that is required for non-arbitrary state power “is that the power be 
exercised in a way that tracks, not the power-holder’s personal welfare or world-view, but 
rather the welfare and world-view of the public”.39 As long as “the law … answers 
systematically to people’s general interests and ideas”, interference is non-arbitrary and 
compatible with a people’s liberty”.40 Democratic instruments of control, desirable and 
indispensable though they are, are “not the be-all and end-all of good government”.41 It is in 





Philip Pettit’s republican theory of democracy 
 
“[I]f we start from the republican conception of freedom as non-domination, then we can 
derive the need for democracy, under a suitable characterization, from the requirements of 
freedom”.42 
 
“No theory would count as a theory of democracy unless it kept faith at a general level with 
the sorts of institutions that we find in most democracies today … the notes struck in the 
theory outlined here resonate in each case with more or less familiar democratic 
institutions”.43 
 
“Let democracy be mistaken for maximally politicised self-government, as it often is, and 
democracy is in serious trouble”.44  
 
“No democratization without depoliticization”.45   
 
The first quotation above makes quite explicit that Pettit perceives his conceptualization of 
freedom as non-domination to ground (and to find institutional form in) a particular 
political regime (‘democracy’) and, indeed, to provide the normative justification of (a 
‘suitably characterized’) democracy. The second quote admonishes the readers not to 
expect that freedom as non-domination will provide a set of criteria with which to criticize 
the institutional arrangement of actually existing democracies and, on that basis, for it to 
lead to an alternative institutional design. His theory, Pettit tells the reader, “resonates” 
with familiar democratic institutions. Indeed, the reader is asked to accept that it would be 
quite inappropriate to expect a theory of democracy to be critical of the institutions of 
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actually existing democracies: unless a theory affirms, or “keeps faith with” ‘what is’, it 
cannot count as theory.46  
 
Yet, we would be ill advised simply to see Pettit’s republican theory of democracy as 
nothing but a scholarly endeavour to convince readers that we live, by and large (“at a 
general level”), in the best of all possible democratic worlds. What we find in Pettit’s theory 
is not so much simply a philosophical justification of democracies ‘as they are’ together 
with minor modifications of their institutional design, but an argument for constraining 
and curtailing democracy: Pettit’s theory of democracy is, indeed, (neo-Roman) 
‘republican’ in so far as it presents itself as a theory of ‘depoliticized democracy’ and an 
admonition against ‘the excesses of democracy’. 
 
Pettit does not associate democracy with the rule of the collective people - democracy, for 
him, does not mean ‘people power’ and does not entail ‘demopraxis’:47 to argue that it does 
would mean, Pettit avers, mistaking democracy for ochlocracy.48 Democracy is “a system 
under which individuals share – and in particular, share equally – in the kratos or control of 
the demos or people over government”.49 Indeed, “[d]emocracy’s entire [emphasis added] 
reason for being … is to guard against the domination of the state”.50  And democratic 
theory exists “to identify the institutions whereby the goal [sc., control over government, 
RA] might be advanced”.51 A republican theory of democracy is thus conceived as a theory 
of the well-ordered, or well-constituted, polity. It is an institutional theory. 
 
Effective and equal popular control of government does not entail that it has to be 
exercised by the people themselves or that it has to be active control, whether exercised by 
the collective people or by any other body.52 Democratic control may be exercised in either 
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an electoral or a contestatory mode: “Whereas the electoral mode … gives the collective 
people [sc., via elected representatives, RA] an indirect power of authorship over the laws, 
the contestatory would give the people, considered individually, [sc., via contestatory 
institutions, RA] a limited and, of course, indirect power of editorship over those laws”.53 
With regard to the contestatory mode, Pettit identifies procedural, consultative, and 
appellate measures that give individual citizens passive rather than active control of what 
happens. These measures and institutions range from the rule of law and the separation of 
powers to bicameralism and independent auditing bodies; from the establishment of 
advisory, community-based bodies and public hearings and inquiries to the publication of 
‘green’ and ‘white’ papers and the conduct of focus-group research into public opinion; and 
from judicial review and tribunals to the institution of ombudsman.54  
 
In addition to being a ‘system of rule’, Pettit understands democracy also as a mode of 
decision-making in a ‘republic of reasons’ in which the state relates to its citizens as a co-
reasoner.55 For decision-making to be rational, democracy, Pettit claims, must be 
‘deliberative’. Government by reasoned argument promises, as a result of institutionalized 
reflexivity through deliberation, rational decision-making in the sense of non-contradictory 
and consistent policies.56 The understanding of democracy as a mechanism of rational 
decision-making on the basis of reasoned deliberation has consequences for the 
institutional design of the democratic system of rule. To start with, Pettit argues that, even 
if one were to concede that the people are rational, informed and public-spirited to a very 
high degree, “it still remains that if they decide on policy issues as they come up over time – 
or even if they decide on a set of issues at the same time – there is every possibility that 
they will collectively support irrational policy-packages”, policies as ‘irrational’ as those – 
to use Pettit’s own example – that require reducing taxes and increasing spending at the 
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same time.57 Pettit avers that the populace, “an unarticulated aggregate of individuals”, is 
not small enough and organized enough to reconsider and resolve such ‘irrationality’. For 
such irrationality to be avoided, individuals are needed who represent the people and who, 
without being mandated, take part in deliberations with other representatives with the aim 
of achieving rational and consistent decision-making: “Representative government … is the 
first requirement of deliberative democracy”.58  
 
Indeed, effective contestability in the form of popular editorial control over governmental 
policies requires that governmental decisions are authorially controlled in a more or less 
rational way, which, for Pettit, means they are controlled “on the basis of considerations 
that get to be generally admitted as relevant to the determination of public affairs”: policy 
decisions as a result of ‘popular referendums’ are, however, liable “to display little or no 
rationality”.59  “Reasoned deliberation” is deliberation conducted by representatives of the 
citizens, with the public views having been passed through – in Madison’s words – “the 
medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of 
their country”.60 “The people as a whole”, Pettit suggests, “can represent the most arbitrary 
and dominating form of government”, for which a regime of representative government is 
the obvious remedy: “… the role of the people is [to be] restricted to the choice of 
personnel, and only rarely runs to the determination of policy”.61 With ‘plebiscitary 
government’ being both ‘unfeasible’ and ‘wholly inimical’ to the cause of deliberation, 
“democratic government is inevitably representative government”.62  
 
 Yet, in order to ensure that deliberation is given a central place in democratic rule, Pettit 
considers it also necessary to reduce “the hands-on power of the people’s elected 
representatives”.63 Rational decision-making via deliberation is challenged and 
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undermined, Pettit maintains, whenever passions enter politics (as, to adduce one of 
Pettit’s example, is the case in the sentencing policy for criminals); whenever ‘aspirational 
morality’ or ‘aspirational ideals’ lead to a ‘politics of moralism’ (as, in Pettit’s example, is 
the case in debates on the legislation of prostitution); whenever sectional electoral 
interests lead to a situation in which politicians actively canvass and obtain the reactions of 
people to various government proposals and then defend the position they take on the 
basis of which lobby represents itself most effectively; and, finally, whenever the self-
interests of politicians are affected (such as decisions on electoral laws or electoral 
boundaries and the number of representatives to be assigned to each area).64 In the light of 
these perennial challenges, so Pettit suggests, “an assembly that operates blindly under 
majority rule won’t be able to live up to the demands of reason and agency”.65 “Where 
electoral interests are likely to militate against the deliberative quality of democratic 
decision-making”, it is imperative that decisions are taken by ‘depoliticized bodies’ of 
experts: decision-making must be “routinely [emphasis added] subject to depoliticized 
checks and controls. The democratic society which leaves the exercise of power to popular 
majorities and political elites may easily become the worst [emphasis added] of 
despotisms”.66  
 
Democracy is “too important to be left in the hands of the politicians”, but neither should it 
be left in the hands of the people.67 Democracy “requires a regime under which people and 
politicians are willing and able to trust in various depoliticized bodies to make decisions on 
certain matters of common interest”.68 Of necessity, in a democracy political power must be 
ceded to experts and professionals – legal-rational administrators.69 As long as these 
unelected authorities are selected on the basis of expertise, experience and impartiality 
and operate under conditions of publicity, we may assume, according to Pettit, that “the 
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decisions [nota bene: ‘decisions’, not ‘proposals’, RA] they make are likely to be ones that 
the people, individually or collectively, would make or approve if they had all the relevant 
information or expertise”.70 Lovett and Pettit clarify the role of ‘expertise’ in a ‘neo-
republican’ democracy:71  
 
Philosophy and theory alone cannot dictate the best way of doing things … Should 
there be a means-tested social security arrangement, or something on the lines of the 
basic income proposal ... Should the power of wealth be regulated by high marginal 
rates of taxation … or by restrictions on what might be done with money, or by 
incentives to provide money for public purposes … Should special rights be extended 
to minority cultures? Questions such as these must be resolved [sc., by expert bodies, 
RA], not as a matter of abstract principle, but on the basis of empirical study.  
 
Pettit defines the members of such expert bodies as ‘indicative representers’: where the 
representer is led in her or his judgements and decisions, I, ‘the represented’, would likely 
to be led, too, if I (instead of her or him) were a member of that body – her or his “decisions 
are indicative of what I would decide” and “the attitudes displayed by the [indicative] 
representer are an evidential sign of the attitudes held by the representee”.72 Instead of 
expecting the representative to be led in her or his actions by considerations of what the 
representee might reasonably be assumed to prefer as the course of action, the representee 
is assumed to be reasonable enough to make the reasoning and the actions of the 
representer her or his own. Why should that be the case? After all, so Pettit asserts, unlike 
elected deputies, these authorities – “ombudsmen, statisticians, and auditors to public 
office, the members of central banks and electoral commissions, and the judges who 
determine the interpretation and application of the law” –, “will not be particularly 
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responsive to specific popular demands; that is how we set things up”.73 However, “when 
we appoint, we can appoint them under such tight constraints and with such precise briefs 
that they count as our indicative representatives”.74  
 
There is yet another aspect to Pettit’s endorsement of ‘depoliticized democracy’. 
Deliberation and policy-making are normatively contained and confined. In a democracy, 
Pettit claims, “there are going to be norms of public policy-making that get to be accepted 
on all sides”.75 These norms – such as consistency, rationality, relevance, acceptability, 
community-commitment – “filter out offending policies and processes, making room only 
for modes of decision-making, and actual decisions, that fit with accepted standards”.76 
These norms “will be in place to outlaw any norm-incompatible routines, and to rule out 
any arguments – and any proposals based on arguments – that do not satisfy the norms”.77 
In a democracy, political actors are required “to propose the policy that they favour … and 
to present considerations to one another that should count as relevant by the lights of 
all”.78 Political actors must play the “acceptability game”: “… the partisans of different view-
points have to recognise that they must find non-partisan considerations – considerations 
that all can see as relevant – to support their proposals”. 79 By playing the ‘acceptability 
game’, citizens demonstrate, so Pettit avers80, their patriotism, which “requires people not 
to allow their more personal or partial attachments – say, those centred on religious 
affiliation, ethnic identity or geographical location – to undermine their commitment to the 
larger community”. And the ‘norm of norms’ requires of public decision-makers that they 
make their decisions “on the basis of neutral [emphasis added] considerations”.81 Pettit 
does not clarify what such ‘neutrality’ might possibly mean for any policy area – nor does 
he discuss the process of norm-generation in a modern, democratic polity.  
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Pettit’s understanding of ‘deliberative democracy’ is quite idiosyncratic: whereas 
‘deliberative democracy’ has been frequently proposed and defended as a means of 
overcoming the participatory deficit in ‘representative democracies’ and of addressing 
(fundamental) disagreements on the basis of inclusive deliberation with a view of 
achieving legitimacy for policy decisions, Pettit’s ‘deliberative democracy’ is decidedly 
‘elitist’ in view of his endorsement of meritocratic representation in the form of the 
‘indicative representer’ who speaks ‘for’ the people – as we saw, in a broad range of public 
issues (the delineation of which is not decided upon by the people themselves). While 
Pettit links the legitimacy of the exercise of political authority in the form of legislation to 
the (democratic) state’s tracking ‘common avowable interests’, he does not pursue the 
question of the (deliberative) interpretation of interest(s) or the (deliberative) formation 
of opinions and the institutional settings in which citizens could engage in meaningful and 
consequential public deliberation.82 Nor, indeed, does Pettit bestow upon public 
deliberation in the ‘contestatory’ dimension of democracy any significance. Contestatory 
democracy entails, after all, that “complaints” by citizens “should be heard away from the 
tumult of popular discussion and away, even, from the theatre of parliamentary debate”.83 
Such a concern with contestation through the medium of public deliberation among 
citizens might have led Pettit to confront the unresolved fundamental problem that haunts 
‘deliberative democracy’: meaningful and consequential ‘deliberation’ presupposes the 




We may recall that Pettit defines democracy “by the fact that the people exercise control 
over government, enjoying equally accessible influence in the imposition of an equally 
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acceptable direction”.85 He accepts that “the self-ruling demos … may … often run on 
automatic pilot, allowing public decision-making to materialize under more or less 
unexamined routines”.86 Yet, what makes the people self-ruling is their capacity “to contest 
decisions at will and, if the contestation establishes a mismatch with their relevant 
interests or opinion, to force an amendment”.87 Yet, we know from empirical political 
science that in ‘actually existing democracies’ there is a pervasive, powerful, and durable 
connection between socio-economic status, educational attainment and political 
participation: “[T]hose who are not affluent and well educated are less likely to take part 
politically and are even less likely to be represented by the activity of organized 
interests”.88 In Pettit’s terminology, the capacity for the exercise of authorial and editorial 
power is unequally distributed across the citizenry. For the notion of ‘equal accessibility’ to 
carry any significance, Pettit would have to engage with ‘empirical’ political science – after 
all, he intends his theory to “resonate” with the reality of existing ‘democracies’.  
 
‘Non-participation’ can arguably be perceived as an aspect of the political economy of 
capitalism. In recent decades, we could observe “ever greater inequality of income and 
property in the countries of democratic capitalism” as a result of an “unparalleled upward 
redistribution” – and, as a consequence, an ever more pronounced tension between the 
egalitarian ideal and demands of democracy and the material inequalities generated by 
capitalism.89 States act as debt-collecting agencies on behalf of a global oligarchy of 
investors and, in the course of performing this task, tie themselves to market principles 
entrenched in international and constitutional law.90 This ‘political’ economy closes down 
the space of democratic politics. It instates the “logic of a pervasive preponderance of 
accumulation, profit, efficiency, competitiveness, austerity and the market over the sphere 
of social rights, political redistribution and sustainability, as well as the defencelessness of 
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the latter sphere against the former, that governs the contemporary version of capitalist 
democracy”.91  
 
In view of this constellation, it is worth taking account of Pettit’s view that republican 
policy is “hostile to material egalitarianism”92: “Suppose we imagine a social world in which 
institutions of private property are not established or are capable of being politically 
eliminated. The ideal of nondomination might make it easier to support the introduction or 
reinforcement of private property in such a situation”.93 Nowhere does Pettit provide an 
analysis of the role of the institution of private property in establishing relationships of 
domination with regard to both dominium as private power and imperium as public power. 
While he refers to the “blight” that American politics has suffered as a result of “the 
wealthy and powerful [exercising] an extraordinary degree of influence and control over 
those whom the people elect”, he does not draw out the significance for democratic politics 
of this fact.94 Pettit does not analyse the interpenetration of dominium and imperium and is 
thus unable critically to engage with theories of democracy and accounts of contemporary 
democratic politics in the ‘capitalist state’ from the perspective of political economy. From 
such a perspective as well as empirical studies on political participation, Pettit’s idea of a 
‘tough luck test’ is seriously flawed: “What democracy would ideally ensure for the subjects 
(n.b.) of a government is that when things go against them, this is not a sign of subjection to 
a malign will. It is a product of tough luck. The disadvantages imposed … may be as blindly 
and blamelessly imposed as a misfortune wrought by the natural world”.95 Rather than 
referring to ‘malign will’, ‘tough luck’ or (natural) ‘misfortune’, should we not more 
appropriately refer to power differentials (arising out and reinforcing inequalities) as the 
reason for a specific distribution (or allocation) of ‘disadvantages’?  
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In the light of the constellation of forces that restrict the space of democratic politics, 
‘democracy’ may perhaps be better conceived, not as an institutional order but as a mode 
of action through which citizens combat inequality and exclusion, as a fight for “equality of 
power and equality of sharing in the benefits and values made possible by social 
cooperation”.96 In this conceptualization, in a genuinely democratic system citizens would 
be agents actively and directly involved in the exercise of power; ‘demotic politics’ would 
thrive on a transformation of the individual from being an object of power to becoming an 
agent.97  
 
Since 2011, we have witnessed a number of ‘unruly’ political mobilizations, many of them 
taking the form of the occupation of public spaces: Tahrir Square in Cairo and Puerta del 
Sol in Madrid; Syntagma Square in Athens and Zuccotti Park in New York are symbols of 
‘discordant’ democratic actions. They stand for struggles against social and economic 
inequality and social injustice; against unresponsive and corrupt governments and 
politicians; against policies of deregulation, privatization, and commodification; against a 
politics of ‘austerity’; against the capture of politics by giant corporations and the collusion 
between business and politicians. They manifest a lack of trust in the institutions of ‘liberal’ 
democracy: they problematize the notions of ‘representation’ and ‘delegation’ as well as 
the notion of ‘majoritarianism’. The activists are convinced that “representation is being 
used as a cover for the domestication and emasculation of politics for the benefit of the few, 
or the 1%”; and the activities  “evince a democratic sensibility: the demand of ordinary 
people to count, to be heard, to participate”.98 Instead of ‘representation’, the activists 
demand ‘direct’, ‘participatory’ democracy: “Real Democracy Now” – self-government and 
self-management. For them, ‘democracy’ is a mode of living, not a system of rule or a 
mechanism of ‘rational’ decision-making. Not for them, then, a vision of democracy that 
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argues the case for further ‘depoliticization’ and for handing decision-making power over 
to ever more ‘experts’ who, as ‘indicative representers’, speak (and decide) neither at their 
behest nor on their behalf but in their stead.99  
 
The ‘indignados’ movements make visible the wider crisis of representation as the crisis of 
legitimacy of ‘liberal’ democracy. But so does the re-emergence of populist movements in 
Western democracies in recent years. Do they not provide convincing reason for embracing 
the idea of “depoliticized democracy”?100 The answer depends upon the explanation for 
their emergence.  If we were to follow the late Peter Mair’s analysis, we would identify an 
ever “widening gap between rulers and ruled” and “the growing enfeeblement of party 
democracy, and the indifference towards party democracy” as well as the diminishing 
practical effect of elections.101 These developments together with the transfer of policy-
making authority away from established, representative organs that are either directly 
elected or are managed directly by elected politicians, to non-majoritarian institutions and 
the establishment of the EU as a political system designed by national politicians “as a 
protected sphere in which policy-making can evade the constraints imposed by 
representative democracy”, have led to an opening for a “strident populist challenge” to 
representative democracy.102 Add to this that the “crucial promise” of democracy, namely, 
that the people can rule and collectively master their fate, has not been fulfilled – and one is 
confronted with a political order that will always be vulnerable to populism.103 Both Mair 
and Mueller emphasize the importance of strengthening the representativeness of the 
political system – with Mueller104 also being adamant that the citizenry needs to 
understand that the promise that the people can rule “in a certain sense simply can’t be 
fulfilled in our societies”. In a way, the critics of liberal democracy – ‘right-wing’ populist 
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movements and ‘indignados’ movements – as well as, in turn, their critics, such as Mair and 
Mueller, aim to ‘repoliticize’ democracy and find new forms of collective self-government. 
 
Here also opens up an opportunity for reconsidering Hannah Arendt’s contribution to 
‘republican’ thinking. According to Arendt, the main characteristic of the crisis of 
modernity, of which totalitarianism is its main manifestation, is the dwindling space for 
action. Politics, for her, means “that men in their freedom can interact with one another 
without compulsion, force, and rule over one another, as equals among equals, 
commanding and obeying one another only in emergencies … but otherwise managing all 
their affairs by speaking with and persuading one another”.105 What is required is 
establishing and maintaining the conditions for perpetuating the enactment of freedom “as 
the freedom to depart and begin something new and unheard-of or as the freedom to 
interact in speech with many others and experience diversity that the world always is in its 
totality”.106 In view of the emasculation of the political realm and the capacity for action, 
Arendt conceptualizes freedom as empowerment rather than ‘participation’, “the freedom 
to act and to be politically active” which she perceives is in contradistinction to an idea of 
freedom that focuses on limiting the sphere of government “in order to realize freedom 
beyond the reach of government”.107 Not for her a notion of freedom as “control over 
government”. Arendt aims not for the citizens’ participation in decision-making; she aims 
to retrieve the promise of politics. 
 
Pettit, on the other hand, argues the case for depoliticizing democracy. In a situation when 
liberal democracy as a normative model and as an “actually existing regime” is confronted 
by a crisis of representation and of legitimacy, Pettit is adamant that one should not 
mistake democracy “for maximally politicised self-government”.108 Pettit could thus be 
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interpreted, in the context of current concerns with ‘populism’, as pitting a ‘meritocratic 
representationalism’ against ‘populist representationalism’. ‘Populism’ does not just thrive 
on a widespread distrust of politicians, elites, and experts that is frequently coupled with a 
frustration of bureaucracy and a diffuse anti-intellectualism. In pitting the ‘pure’ people 
against the ‘corrupt’ elite, it aims to define who ‘the people’ are. The populist leaders speak 
to a particular audience and speak for particular constituencies. In order to be successful, 
the populist definition of the ‘identity’ of ‘the people’ and the representational claim of the 
populist leader(s) must resonate with ‘the people’, and is thus dependent upon discursive 
mobilisation as well as public enactment.109 Pettit’s ‘meritocratic representationalism’ does 
not only reinforce ‘populist’ concerns (and anger) with rule by ‘experts’, but also lacks the 
means of challenging the populist discourse and populist political mobilization. It can be 
seen as an expression of a liberal-republican fear of the unruly and irrational demos. 
Arguably, remaining true to (the neo-Roman) republican tradition of disempowering the 
demos, Pettit endeavours to contain and tame the (‘common’) people and writes the people 
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